We study an economic setting in which a principal motivates a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort toward the success of a joint project. The action of each agent is hidden and affects the outcome of the agent's individual task in a stochastic manner. A Boolean technology function maps the outcomes of the individual tasks to the project's outcome. The principal induces a Nash equilibrium on the agents' actions through payments which are conditioned on the project's outcome and the main challenge is that of determining the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the principal's net utility, namely, the optimal contract.
Introduction
We consider the setting in which a principal motivates a team of rational agents to exert costly effort toward the success of a joint project, where the actions of the agents are hidden from the principal. The outcome (usually, success or failure of the project) is stochastically determined by the set of actions taken by the agents and is visible to all. As agents' actions are invisible, their compensation depends on the outcome and the principal's challenge is to design contracts (conditional payments to the agents) as to maximize her net utility, given the payoff that she obtains from a successful outcome.
The problem of hidden actions in production teams has been extensively studied in the economics literature [11, 14, 19, 12, 20] . More recently, the problem has been examined from a computational perspective [9, 1, 4, 2, 13, 6, 3, 5] . This line of research complements the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD) [16, 15, 18, 8, 17] that received much attention in the past decade. While AMD studies the design of mechanisms in scenarios characterized by private information held by the individual agents, our focus is on the complementary problem, that of hidden-action taken by the individual agents. The model. We use the model presented in [1] (which is an extension of the model devised in [21] ). In this model, a principal employs a set 1 N of agents in a joint project. Each agent i takes an action a i ∈ {0, 1}, which is known only to him, and succeeds or fails in his own task probabilistically and independently. The individual outcome of agent i is denoted by x i ∈ {0, 1}. If the agent shirks (a i = 0), he succeeds in his individual task (x i = 1) with probability 0 < γ i < 1 and incurs no cost. If, however, he decides to exert effort (a i = 1), he succeeds with probability 0 < δ i < 1, where δ i > γ i , but incurs some positive real cost c i > 0.
A key component of the model is the way in which the individual outcomes determine the outcome of the whole project.
We assume a monotone Boolean function ϕ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} that determines whether the project succeeds as a function of the individual outcomes of the n agents' tasks (and is not determined by any set of n −1 agents). Two fundamental examples of such Boolean functions are AND and OR. The AND function is the logical conjunction of x i (ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) =  i∈N x i ), representing the case in which the project succeeds only if all agents succeed in their tasks. In this case, we say that the agents complement each other. The OR function represents the other extreme, in which the project succeeds if at least one of the agents succeeds in his task. This function is the logical disjunction of x i (ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) =  i∈N x i ), and we say that the agents substitute each other.
Given the action profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ {0, 1} n and a monotone Boolean function ϕ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, the effectiveness of the action profile a, denoted by f (a), is the probability that the whole project succeeds under a and ϕ according to the distribution specified above. That is, the effectiveness f (a) is defined as the probability that ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 1, where x i ∈ {0, 1} is determined probabilistically (and independently) by a i : if a i = 0, then x i = 1 with probability γ i ; if a i = 1, then x i = 1 with probability δ i . The monotonicity of ϕ and the assumption that δ i > γ i for every i ∈ N imply the monotonicity of the effectiveness function f , i.e., if we denote by a −i ∈ {0, 1} n−1 the vector of actions taken by all agents excluding agent i (namely, a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n )), then the effectiveness function must satisfy f (1, a −i ) > f (0, a −i ) for every i ∈ N and a −i ∈ {0, 1} n−1 . Note that it is inherent to our model (in fact, the model of [1] ) that the effectiveness f (a) consists of a ''probabilistic component'' that determines the individual outcomes x 1 , . . . , x n and a ''deterministic component'' that maps these individual outcomes to success or failure of the whole project.
The agents' success probabilities, the costs of exerting effort, and the monotone Boolean function that determines the final outcome define the technology, formally defined as the five-tuple t = ⟨N,
, ϕ⟩, where N is a (finite) set of agents, γ i (respectively, δ i ) is the probability that x i = 1 when agent i shirks (resp., when agent i exerts effort), where δ i > γ i , c i is the cost incurred on agent i for exerting effort, and ϕ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} is the monotone Boolean function that maps the individual outcomes x 1 , . . . , x n to the outcome of the whole project. We sometimes abuse notation and refer to the Boolean function ϕ as the technology. It is important to emphasize that the technology is assumed to be known by the principal and the agents.
Since exerting effort entails some positive cost, an agent will not exert effort unless induced to do so by appropriately designed incentives. The principal can motivate the agents by offering them individual payments. However, due to the nonvisibility of the agents' actions, the individual payments cannot be directly contingent on the actions of the agents, but rather only on the success of the whole project. The conditional payment to agent i is thus given by a real value p i ≥ 0 that is granted to agent i by the principal if the project succeeds (otherwise, the agent receives 0 payment). 2 The expected utility of agent i under the profile of actions a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and the conditional payment p i is p i · f (a) if a i = 0, and p i · f (a) − c i if a i = 1. Given a real payoff v > 0 that the principal obtains from a successful outcome of the project, the principal wishes to design the payments p i as to maximize her own expected utility defined as U a (v 
, where the action profile a is assumed to be at Nash-equilibrium with respect to the payments p i (i.e., no agent can improve his utility by a unilateral deviation). As multiple Nash equilibria may (and actually do) exist, we focus on the one that maximizes the utility of the principal. This is as if we let the principal choose the desired Nash equilibrium, and ''suggest'' it to the agents. The following observation is established in [1] .
Observation. The best conditional payments (from the principal's point of view) that induce the action profile a ∈ {0, 1}
n as a Nash equilibrium are p i = 0 for agent i who shirks (a i = 0), and p i = The last observation implies that once the principal chooses the action profile a ∈ {0, 1} n , her (maximum) expected utility is determined to be U a (v) = f (a) · (v − p(a)), where p(a) is the total payment (in the case of a successful outcome of the project), given by p(a) = 
. Therefore the principal's goal is merely to choose a subset S ⊆ N of agents that exert effort (the rest of the agents shirk) so that her expected utility is maximized. The agent subset S is referred to as a contract and we say that the principal contracts with agent i if i ∈ S. We sometimes abuse notation and denote f (S), p(S) and U S (v) instead of f (a), p(a) and U a (v), respectively, where
While finding the optimal set of payments that induces a particular set of agents to exert effort is a straightforward task (and can be efficiently computed), finding an optimal contract for a given payoff v > 0 is the main challenge addressed in this
, ϕ⟩, we refer to the collection of contracts that can be obtained as an optimal contract for some payoff as the orbit of t (ties between different contracts are broken according to a lexicographic order 3 ). Once the contract S ⊆ N is chosen, the expected utility of the principal U S (v) = f (S)(v − p(S)) becomes a linear function of the payoff v. Therefore each contract S corresponds to some line in R 2 . It follows that computing the orbit of t is equivalent to identifying the (positive) top envelope of the line collection
It is easy to see that for sufficiently low payoffs, no agent will ever be contracted while for sufficiently high payoffs, all agents will always be contracted. Therefore the trivial contracts ∅ and N are always in the orbit. Let v * = inf{v > 0 | N is optimal for v}. Clearly, the trivial contract N is optimal for every v > v * and the infinite interval (v * , ∞) does not exhibit any transitions in the orbit. We refer to the payoffs in the interval (0, v * ] as the relevant payoffs.
Our results. Multi-agent projects may exhibit delicate combinatorial structures of dependencies between the agents' actions, which can be represented by a wide range of monotone Boolean functions. In the two extremes of this range reside two simple and natural functions, namely AND and OR, which correspond to the respective cases of pure complementarities and pure substitutabilities. These are arguably the two most fundamental interrelations between agents' actions.
The AND case was fully analyzed in [1] . In particular, it was (implicitly) shown that the optimal contract of any AND technology can be computed in polynomial time. In contrast, the OR case was left unresolved to the most part. Specifically, one of the main open questions raised in [1] asked whether the optimal contract problem on OR technologies can be solved in polynomial time.
We provide a complete analysis of the computational complexity of the optimal contract problem on OR technologies. Our first theorem, established in Section 2, addresses the hardness of this problem. Note that aside from establishing the computational hardness of the problem, our analysis implies the existence of OR technologies which admit exponential-size orbits, thus refuting a conjecture raised in [1] .
Theorem 1.
The problem of computing the optimal contract in OR technologies is NP-hard. 4 The problem remains NP-hard even for the special case in which c i = 1 and
This hardness result is complemented by an approximation scheme in Section 3.2.
Theorem 2. The problem of computing the optimal contract in OR technologies admits a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS).
In fact, the FPTAS devised in Theorem 2 is based on a more general scheme, developed in Section 3.1. This scheme can be applied to a generalization of AND and OR technologies, referred to as series-parallel (SP) technologies that we now turn to define.
SP functions are monotone Boolean functions defined inductively as follows. The uni-argument identity function is considered SP. Consider two SP functions ϕ l : {0, 1} n l → {0, 1} and ϕ r : {0, 1} n r → {0, 1}. The Boolean functions ϕ l ∧ ϕ r : {0, 1} n l +n r → {0, 1}, defined as the logical conjunction of ϕ l and ϕ r , and ϕ l ∨ ϕ r : {0, 1} n l +n r → {0, 1}, defined as the logical disjunction of ϕ l and ϕ r , are also considered SP. We refer to the former (respectively, the latter) as a series composition (resp., a parallel composition) of ϕ l and ϕ r , hence the name series-parallel. Since series and parallel compositions are associative, it follows that the class of SP Boolean functions is indeed a generalization of both AND and OR Boolean functions. SP Boolean functions are of great interest to computer science. For instance, they play an important role in combinatorial games due to their equivalence to game trees (AND-OR trees).
General SP technologies are considerably more involved and the approximability of the optimal contract problem on such technologies remains an open question. However, an interesting insight into this question is provided by a scheme that approximates all but a small fraction of the relevant payoffs. The following theorem is established in Section 3.3.
Theorem 3.
Given an SP technology t and two real parameters 0 < ϵ,ε ≤ 1, there exists a scheme that on input payoff v > 0, either returns a (1 + ϵ)-approximate solution for v or outputs a failure message, in time poly(|t|, 1/ϵ, 1/ε). Assuming that F ⊆ R >0 is the set of reals on which the scheme outputs a failure message, it is guaranteed that
It may be the case that the hardness of the optimal contract problem on SP technologies is somehow ''concentrated'' exactly in those payoffs which cannot be reached by the scheme of Theorem 3. However, if an instance of the problem is chosen uniformly at random out of the ''relevant instances'', then with high probability our scheme provides a good approximation for this instance. (Recall that the trivial contract N is optimal for any non-relevant payoff.) In fact, the payoffs v on which the scheme of Theorem 3 outputs a failure message belong to a small (polynomial) number of sub-intervals of (0, v Finally, we obtain a positive result regarding the general case. Consider an arbitrary technology t and let S be a collection of contracts. Given some real α > 1, we say that S is an α-approximation of t's orbit if for every payoff v, there exists a
, where T is optimal for v. The following theorem, which guarantees the existence of a polynomial size collection approximating t, is established in Section 3.4.
Theorem 4. For every technology t
, ϕ⟩ and for any ϵ > 0, the orbit of t admits a (1 + ϵ)-approximation of size poly(|t|, 1/ϵ).
Unfortunately, in the case of arbitrary technologies (as opposed to OR technologies) we do not know how to construct the approximating collection efficiently.
NP-hardness of OR technologies
In this section, we establish the NP-hardness of the optimal contract problem on OR technologies.
Theorem 1. The problem of computing the optimal contract in OR technologies is NP-hard.
We start with a high-level description.
Overview. We present a polynomial time Turing reduction from X3SAT (Problem LO4 in [10] ) to the problem of computing an optimal contract for an OR technology. A 3-CNF formula φ is solvable under X3SAT if there exists a truth assignment for the variables of φ that assigns true to exactly one literal in every clause. The X3SAT problem is known to be NP-hard even if the literals in φ are all positive. Given a 3-CNF formula φ with m clauses and n variables in which all literals are positive, we construct an
, ϕ⟩ such that (1) the agent set N contains n + 5 agents, (2) the cost incurred on agent j for exerting effort is c j = 1 for every j ∈ N, and (3) γ j = 1 − δ j for every j ∈ N. The construction is designed to guarantee that by performing O(n) queries, each revealing the optimal contract for some carefully chosen payoff, we can decide whether φ is solvable under X3SAT.
Let i and fix µ = 4 5(m+2) . The evaluation of x is defined to be τ (
κ is a sufficiently large constant. We would have wanted to fix γ j = 1 − δ j = τ (u j ) · ϵ for every j ∈ N. Unfortunately, the standard binary representation of τ (u j ) may be much larger than the binary representation of φ for some j, and in particular, exponential in m. To overcome this obstacle, we use a carefully chosen estimation of τ (u j ), so that on the one hand, the desired properties of the evaluation function are preserved, and on the other hand, the binary representation of γ j (and δ j ) is polynomial in m. In particular, the choice of {γ j } n+5 j=1 and {δ j } n+5 j=1 guarantees that for every two contracts S, T ⊆ N, f (S) > f (T ) if and only if |S| > |T | or |S| = |T | and u S is lexicographically smaller than u T . We argue that if some contracts S with u S = (1, . . . , 1) exist, then at least one of them is in the orbit. This is done as follows. A vector x = (x 0 , . . . , x m+3 ) is said to be protected if x m+2 = x m+3 = 1. The key lemma of our proof asserts that any contract assigned with a protected vector x cannot be dominated by any two contracts assigned with different vectors. Following some standard geometric arguments, we conclude that the contracts assigned with x cannot be dominated by any set of (other) contracts. More formally, for every 0 ≤ k ≤ n + 5, we denote Ψ k (x) = {S ⊆ N | u S = x and |S| = k}, and show that for any protected vector x, if Ψ k (x) is not empty, then at least one contract in Ψ k (x) is in the orbit. In particular, assuming that x = (1, . . . , 1), if Ψ k (x) ̸ = ∅, then there exist a contract S ∈ Ψ k (x) and a payoff v * k such that S is optimal for v * k .
Computing the payoff v * k for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 5 remains our ultimate challenge. To achieve this goal, we define two additional vectors w = (2, 1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ W and y = (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ W . The choice of the additional vectors guarantees that if Ψ k (x) is not empty, then neither are Ψ k (y) and Ψ k (w). Suppose that Ψ k (x) ̸ = ∅ and fix λ
. We show that the optimal contract for every λ The decision whether the formula φ is solvable under X3SAT is now carried out as follows. For k = 1, . . . , n+5, we query on the optimal contract S k for the payoff v * k . If u S k is of the form (1, . . . , 1) for some k, then φ must be solvable. Otherwise, there does not exist any such contract and φ is not solvable. The reduction. We now turn to describe the reduction in detail. Let W = {0, 1, 2, 3}
The first n agents correspond to the n variables of the 3-CNF formula φ. Assuming that variable j appears in clauses Γ j ⊆ {1, . . . , m} (always as a positive literal), the vector u j is defined so that
. . , 5 are provided for the sake of the analysis. To avoid cumbersome indexing, we denote n + 1 and n + 2 by α and β, respectively, and n + 3, n + 4 and n + 5 by A, B and C , respectively. Agents α and β are assigned 
Agents α, β and B can be added to S, thus setting u
without affecting any other coordinate. We will show that if such a contract exists, then it is optimal for some payoff v * which will be determined later on.
Vector evaluations. We now turn to define the parameters γ i and δ i of the agents. For that purpose, we first have to define a couple of functions that map the vectors in W to the reals. Consider the vector x = (x 0 , . . . ,
and fix µ = 4 5(m+2) . The partial evaluation of x is defined to be
and the full evaluation of x is defined to be
, where κ is a sufficiently large constant (independent of m and n) that will be determined later on. We would have wanted to define the effectiveness factors of the OR technology by fixing γ j = 1 − δ j = τ (u j ) · ϵ for every j ∈ N. Unfortunately, the standard binary representation of τ (u j ) may be much larger than the binary representation of φ for some j, and in particular, exponential in m. We handle this obstacle by estimating the vector evaluations as follows.
Note that since x i ≤ 3 for every 0 ≤ i ≤ m + 1, and since µ >
, it follows that µ > (σ (x)) 5 for every
Note that the size of the binary representation of  τ (x) is polynomial (linear actually) in m. The technology t is now determined by fixing
for all j ∈ N.
Next, we establish some important properties of the vector evaluations. We impose a lexicographic order on the vectors in W : the vector x = (x 0 , . . . , x m+3 ) is lexicographically greater than the vector y = (y 0 , . . . , y m+3 ) if there exists a coordinate 0 ≤ j ≤ m + 3 such that x i = y i for every i > j and x j > y j . Clearly, for any two vectors x, y ∈ W , the full evaluation of x is greater than the full evaluation of y if and only if x is lexicographically greater than y.
Proposition 2.1. Let x = (x 0 , . . . , x m+3 ) and y = (y 0 , . . . , y m+3 ) be two vectors in W such that x is lexicographically greater than y.
and (ii) if x m+2 = y m+2 and x m+3 = y m+3 , then µ
Proof. The bound in (i) follows immediately from the definition of full evaluation as the partial evaluation is 1 + o(1). To establish (ii), note that since τ (x) > τ (y) although x m+2 = y m+2 and x m+3 = y m+3 , we must have τ p (x) > τ p (y). By the definition of partial evaluation, it follows that
The proof is completed as τ (
Let S ⊆ N be some contract and assume that |S| = k > 0. Let ν be the maximum among all constants hidden in the O notation of (2), that is, τ (u
By the definition of OR technologies, we have
Following a similar line of arguments, we conclude that f (∅) = O(ϵ 1/2 ). The next proposition can now be established.
Proposition 2.2. Let S, S

′ ⊆ N be two contracts and let k
Proof. The first claim follows immediately from (3) by taking ϵ ≪ χ −1 . For the second claim, note that by (3), it is sufficient
. This is guaranteed due to Proposition 2.1 by taking ϵ ≪ µ to the agents in S, where |S| = k, can now be expressed as
where S −j denotes the contract S −{ j} and the last equation follows by taking ϵ < (n+5)
Note that π (S) < |S| for every contract S ⊆ N since each term in the sum is smaller than 1. Let S ⊆ N be some contract and assume that |S| = k > 0. By plugging (3) and (4) into the definition of utility, we get
where the last equation is guaranteed by taking ϵ < ((n + 5)χ ) −4/3 . For the empty contract, we have p(∅) = 0 and
, we refer to the payoff on which the lines U S (·) and U T (·) intersect as the intersection payoff of S and
The next lemma correlates the intersection payoffs to the size of the contracts and to the vectors representing the contracts. 
.
It remains to consider the case 0 = k < k ′ . Once again by comparing the utilities of S and S
hence, by taking ϵ < χ
The bounds in (ii) are established by taking ϵ < (max {(n + 5), χ})
We argue that if x is a protected vector in W , and if Ψ k (x) ̸ = ∅, then at least one contract in Ψ k (x) is in the top envelope of the line collection {U S (·) | S ⊆ N}. We first establish some bounds related to π (·).
Proof. Suppose that u S is protected. First observe that since α ∈ S − β, it follows that τ (u
, and
Now suppose that u S is not protected. We choose agent j ′ as follows. If α ∈ S or β ∈ S, then let j ′ be the (sole) agent in
Since coordinate m + 2 is set in both u S and u S ′ , we have
Geometric interpretation. Consider the collection F of all continuous functions g : R → R. Let H be a finite subset of F and let g be a function in F . We say that g is dominated by the functions in H if for every v ∈ R, there exists a function g We now turn to state the main lemma of this section, namely, that a contract assigned with a protected vector cannot be dominated by any two contracts assigned with different vectors. 
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that f (R) ≤ f (T ). Proposition 2.2 implies that f (S) ̸ = f (R) and f (S) ̸ = f (T ), hence it is sufficient to consider the case f (R) < f (S) < f (T ) (otherwise, S cannot be dominated by R and T ). We prove that v[R, S] < v[S, T ]. This establishes the lemma as it implies that 
= Ω(ϵ In what follows we assume that k
. We have to show that
. By taking ϵ < χ −4 , it is sufficient to prove that (π (T )
. Instead, we take ϵ ≪ µ −8 and establish the stronger bound
Since u S is protected, and since τ (u R ) > τ (u S ), we conclude that u R must be protected too. As for u T , we have to consider both cases (protected or not). If u T is not protected, then we establish Eq. (7) by proving that π (T )(τ (
, thus the assertion holds. In the remainder of this proof we assume that u R , u S and u T are all protected.
We will soon show that
thus, by the definition of full evaluation, it follows that
As Proposition 2.1 guarantees that τ
Eq. (7) follows due to Proposition 2.4 and the assertion holds.
To establish Eq. (8) can be rewritten as
which is equivalent to
due to the Taylor expansions
It is easy to verify that the j th terms of the six sums on the left hand side of Eq. (9) cancel each other for j = 0, 1, 2. For j = 3, the terms on the left hand side of Eq. (9) sums up to
It remains to show that the absolute value of the sums on the left hand side of Eq. (9) for j = 4, 5, . . . is o(µ −3 ). Instead we bound the larger expression
where the equality in the middle follows from µ = Ω  (a + b) 5 
. Therefore Eq. (9) is satisfied and the assertion holds.
The next corollary follows.
Corollary 2.7. If x is a protected vector in W , then for every
and a payoff v such that S is optimal for v.
Consider the vector x = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ W . Recall that our goal is to decide whether there exists a contract S with u S = x. Note that S is of size at least 4 as it must contain agents α, β, B and at least one more agent. For every 4 ≤ k ≤ n + 5, Corollary 2.7 guarantees that if Ψ k (x) is not empty, then such a contract S is optimal for some payoff v * 
and λ
. Propositions 2.1 and 2.5 imply that
By the definition of full evaluation, we have
The assertion follows.
The analysis is completed with the following lemma, which together with Lemma 2.8 derives Theorem 1. 
Approximations
In this section we provide approximation results for the optimal contract problem. The section begins with Section 3.1, which provides a general approximation scheme for arbitrary SP technologies. This scheme is carried through Algorithm Calibrate, presented in this section. Based on the general scheme presented in Section 3.1, in Section 3.2, we construct an FPTAS for arbitrary OR technologies. Another use of Algorithm Calibrate is presented in Section 3.3, where we provide a scheme that approximates all but a small fraction of the relevant payoffs for any SP technology. Finally, Section 3.4 deals with the most general case, and shows that every technology admits a polynomial size collection that approximates the optimal contract.
A general scheme
Consider some technology t = ⟨N, {γ
, ϕ⟩ and let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary contract. We first observe that if ϕ is the AND function, then the effectiveness of S is given by f (S) =  i∈S δ i  i∈N−S γ i . For the OR function, we have 
It is easy to verify that if t is an AND technology or an OR technology, then
The following lemma generalizes this property to the whole range of technologies. (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Since ϕ is not a function of any n − 1 variables, it cannot assign 0 to all rows of the table. Therefore, the minimum possible effectiveness is achieved when ϕ assigns 1 to exactly one row (otherwise, it can achieve a lower value by replacing a single 1 value with 0). By the monotonicity of ϕ, this single row must correspond to x 1 = · · · = x n = 1. (This is exactly the truth table of the AND function.) Clearly, the minimum possible effectiveness is achieved when all agents shirk. Combined together, the minimum possible effectiveness is simply I P (
The proof that the maximum possible effectiveness is I P (
is analogous. Our scheme is executed by an algorithm, referred to as Algorithm Calibrate, which we shall soon present. The description of Algorithm Calibrate requires some preparation.
Consider
, ϕ⟩ input to Algorithm Calibrate and let 0 < ρ ≤ 1 be the performance parameter of the algorithm. Algorithm Calibrate generates a collection C of contracts in time O  requires Ω(log(1/∆)) bits.) We will soon prove that for every contract T ⊆ N, there exists a contract S ∈ C such that f (S) ≥ f (T ) (1+ρ)
, and p(S) ≤ (1 + ρ)p(T ). 
· log 1+η (2), and since log 1+η (2) ≤ 
The collection of these smaller intervals is called the scale. Refer to Fig. 3 for an illustration of the scale. The precision of the scale is defined as 1 + η. We say that contract S is calibrated to interval I in the scale if f (S) ∈ I. (Recall that Lemma 3.1 implies that every contract is calibrated to some interval in the scale.) 
Observation 3.2. Let S, S ′ ∈ N be two contracts. The scale is designed to ensure that if S and S
′ are calibrated to the same interval, then
Throughout the execution, Algorithm Calibrate maintains a collection C of contracts. The algorithm guarantees that no two contracts in C are calibrated to the same interval, thus |C| ≤ 2r + 3 at any given moment.
Every SP function ϕ is constructed inductively from two simpler SP functions by either a series composition or by a parallel composition. Therefore the function ϕ can be represented by a full binary tree T , referred to as the composition tree of ϕ. The leaves of T represents the identity functions of ϕ's arguments. An internal node is said to be an ∧-node (respectively, an ∨-node) if it represents a series (resp., parallel) composition of the functions represented by its children. (Refer to Fig. 4 for an illustration.)
, ϕ⟩ and let T be the tree that represents the Boolean function ϕ. Let x be some node in T and consider the subtree T x of T rooted at x. The subtree T x corresponds to some (SP) subtechnology t x of t. Let N x denote the set of agents in t x (corresponding to the leaves of T x ) and let m x denote the number of nodes in T x (as T is a full binary tree, we have m x = 2|N x | − 1). Given some contract S ⊆ N x , we denote the effectiveness and payment of S under t x by f x (S) and p x (S), respectively.
Suppose that x is an internal node in T with left child l and right child r. Let S = L ∪R be some contract in t x , where L ⊆ N l and R ⊆ N r . Clearly, if x is an ∧-node, then f x (S) = f l (L) · f r (R), and if x is an ∨-node, then f x (S)
, and if x is an ∨-node,
With this we are ready to present Algorithm Calibrate. Algorithm Calibrate traverses the composition tree T in a postorder fashion. Consider some leaf x in T that corresponds to agent i ∈ N. The algorithm calibrates the contracts ∅ and {i} to a (fresh) scale according to their effectiveness under the technology t x , that is, f x (∅) = γ i and f x ({i}) = δ i . If both ∅ and {i} are calibrated to the same interval I, then {i} is removed from the scale. The resulting contract(s) in the scale constitutes the collection C x . Now, consider some internal node x in T with left child l and right child r and suppose that the algorithm has already constructed the collections C l and C r for the technologies t l and t r , respectively. The collection C x for the technology t x is constructed as follows.
contracts of the technology t x .) The contracts in S are calibrated to a (fresh) scale according to the effectiveness function f x (·). Consequently, there may exist some interval in the new scale to which two (or more) contracts are calibrated (a conflict).
Let I be an interval in the scale and suppose that S 1 , . . . , S k ∈ S were all calibrated to I (k > 1), that is, f x (S i ) ∈ I for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Assume without loss of generality that S k admits a minimum payment under t x , i.e., p x (S k ) ≤ p x (S i ) for every 1 ≤ i < k. The algorithm then resolves the conflict by removing the contracts S 1 , . . . , S k−1 from the scale so that S k remains the only contract calibrated to I. In that case we say that the contracts S 1 , . . . , S k−1 were compensated by the contract S k . The contracts that remain in the scale constitutes the collection C x . Thus the new collection C x contains at most one contract for every interval and we may proceed with the next stage of the algorithm. At the end of this postorder process, when Algorithm Calibrate reaches the root z of T , it returns the collection C = C z .
We turn to the analysis of Algorithm Calibrate. The running time of the algorithm is determined by the number of nodes in T (which is 2n − 1) and by the size of the collection C x for every node x in the tree. The latter cannot exceed the number of intervals in the scale which is O 
We say that a collection S of contracts is an α-estimation of the technology t if for every contract S ′ ⊆ N there exists a contract S ∈ S such that S is an α-estimation of S ′ under t. The following observation serves as a key ingredient in the proof of Lemma 3.4, which is the main lemma in this section.
Observation 3.3. For any choice of reals
We are now ready to establish Lemma 3.4. 
We argue that the contract L ∪ R is a (1 + η)
and Condition (10) holds trivially. Condition (11) holds by plugging
, and b
It remains to prove that Condition (12) holds. If x is an ∧-node, then
On the other hand, if x is an ∨-node, then
The argument follows.
The contract L ∪ R is considered by the algorithm in the scale that corresponds to node x. If L ∪ R survives and finds its way to C x , then the proof is completed. Assume that L ∪ R is compensated by some contract S ∈ C x . We prove that S is a (1 + η) (10) and (11) 
, ϕ⟩ and a performance parameter 0 < ρ ≤ 1, it is guaranteed that Algorithm Calibrate generates a collection C ⊆ 2 N that serves as a
An FPTAS for OR technologies
In this section we establish an FPTAS for OR technologies.
Theorem 2. The problem of computing the optimal contract in OR technologies admits a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS).
The proof of Theorem 2 requires several preparations. We first establish several properties of OR technologies which will be used to present the desired FPTAS starting with the sub-modularity of OR technologies. We say that a function h : 
Dividing both equations by
The last inequality holds if and only if
which in turn, can be rewritten as
The assertion follows as δ i > γ i for every i ∈ N.
Consider an arbitrary
, ϕ⟩. Let T ⊆ N be some contract, |T | ≥ 2, and consider some partition
Another consequence is that p j (R i ) < p j (T ) for every i = 1, 2 and every agent j ∈ R i (this consequence is derived by considering the sets R i and T − j), thus p(R 1 ) + p(R 2 ) < p(T ). These consequences of Lemma 3.6 are employed to establish the following key property. 
By summing the last inequality for i = 1, 2, we obtain
, in contradiction to Lemma 3.6. We conclude that for every j ∈ T , either 
By Lemma 3.6, we obtain
which can be rewritten as
As T is optimal for v, we have
By the assumption that v − p(T ) <σ p(T ), we conclude that
By the choice of j, we havê
Another application of Lemma 3.6 deduces that
and hence f ({ j}) > (1 −σ )f (T ), which completes the proof.
We are now ready to establish an FPTAS for the optimal contract problem on OR technologies. Let ϵ > 0 be the performance parameter of the FPTAS. (Recall that for every ϵ > 0, the FPTAS returns a solution which is at most 1 + ϵ times worse than the optimal solution in time poly(|t|, 1/ϵ).) Subsequently, we assume that ϵ ≤ 1/n at the price of incurring an extra additive poly(|t|) term on the running time.
, and let C be the collection generated by Algorithm Calibrate when invoked on t with performance parameter ρ = . The FPTAS will consider the contracts in C ∪ {{ j} | j ∈ N}, namely, the contracts in C and all the singleton contracts. Consider an arbitrary payoff v > 0 and let T ⊆ N be an optimal contract for v. In order to establish Theorem 2, we have to prove that there exists a contract
Assume first that v < (1 +σ )p(T ). Sinceσ < σ ≤ 1/n, we may apply Lemma 3.7 and conclude that there exists some agent j ∈ N such that f ({ j}) > (1 −σ )f (T ). By Lemma 3.6, we have p({ j}) ≤ p(T ), hence 
The requirement 
Approximation for almost all relevant instances of SP technologies
Our goal in this section is to establish Theorem 3. Consider some (finite) line collection L. We denote the maximum real to which v is assigned under L by 
, ϕ⟩. Let L be the line collection which contains the line corresponding to U S for every S ⊆ N.
Let 0 < ϵ,ε ≤ 1 be the (real) parameters of Theorem 3. Fix σ = ϵ/3 andσ =ε/(4n ln(1/∆) + 6). We invoke Algorithm Calibrate on t with performance parameter ρ = σσ 1+σ to generate the contract collection C and append the contracts ∅ and N to C (if they are not already there). Consider the line collection K which contains the line corresponding to U S for every S ∈ C. Given some line K ∈ K, we define its shadow lineK by setting s(K ) = s(K ) and r(K ) = r(K )/(1 + ρ) (see Fig. 5 ). The shadow line collection is defined to beK = {K | K ∈ K}.
Corollary 3.5 guarantees that for every line L ∈ L, there exists some line
By the definition ofK, we conclude that for every line L ∈ L, there exists some lineK ∈K such that
which gives rise to the following corollary. On payoff v ∈ R >0 given as input, our algorithm works as follows. We first test whether K(v) ≥K(v)/(1 + σ ) (both K andK are computed in time poly(|t|, 1/ϵ, 1/ε) and are available whenever we wish to perform this test). If this test is positive, then we return the contract S ∈ C which corresponds to a line K ∈ K that realizes K(v). Corollary 3.8 guarantees that U S (v) ≥ U T (v)/(1 + ϵ) for any contract T ⊆ N as promised by Theorem 3. Otherwise (if the above test is negative), we output a failure message. It remains to bound the fraction of payoffs v out of all relevant payoffs for which K does not provide a (1 + σ )-approximation with respect toK. Note that there may be some non-relevant payoffs on which our algorithm outputs a failure message and we will account for them as well.
Let J be an orbit ofK. Let J 0 , . . . , J k+1 be the lines in J ordered such that ∆ ≤ s(J 0 ) < · · · < s(J k+1 ) < 1 (recall that s(K ) = s(K ) for everyK ∈K, hence the slopes in J are bounded between ∆ and 1 − ∆). It is easy to verify that 
Consider some v ∈ R >0 and let
If v is not a transition real (which means that v is neither v i nor v i+1 ), then we say that J i is optimal for v. If i = 0 (i.e., if r(J i ) = 0), then K(v) = J(v) since by definition, there exists some line K ∈ K such that s(K ) = s(J 0 ) and r(K ) = r(J 0 ) = 0 (K corresponds to the contract ∅). Now, consider some v ∈ R >0 and let J i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, be an optimal line for v. We say that v is a bad real if v ∈ (v i , r(J i )(1 +σ )); otherwise, v is said to be a good real. The following proposition covers the good reals. 
By the choice of ρ = σσ 1+σ , we conclude that J(v)/K(v) ≤ (1 + σ )σ σ (1+σ )−σσ = 1 + σ , thus establishing the proposition.
We define the bad interval exhibited by the line J i to be
By Corollary 3.8 and Proposition 3.9, it is sufficient to bound (from above) the ratio Φ =  k+1 i=1 |B i |/v * . This is carried out in two stages: (1) bounding the ratio 
=σ . By the choice ofσ , it follows that Φ 2 ≤ε/2. The bound on Φ 1 is more involved and depends on the geometric insight established in Lemma 3.10. In the scope of this lemma, we ignore the combinatorial agency interpretation of J 0 , . . . , J k+1 and consider them merely as lines with slopes 
Proof. For the sake of the analysis, we modify the line collection {J 0 , . . . , J k+1 } in a manner that can only increase Φ 1 . First, if the line J i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, exhibits an empty bad interval, i.e., if v i ≥ r i (1 +σ ), then we remove it from the collection {J 0 , . . . , J k+1 }. This is repeated until every remaining line J i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, exhibits a non-empty bad interval. In attempt to avoid cumbersome notation, we assume that the remaining lines are renamed J 0 , . . . , J k+1 from scratch with s i , r i , and v i defined as before, after this step. (The parameter k may have decreased as a result of the above step, but this causes the required bound 1 − e −σ (2 log k ln(1/∆)+3) to decrease, hence it is sufficient to prove the assertion for a smaller k.) By removing those lines, we cannot decrease the ratio Φ 1 since good reals may have turned bad, but not vice versa. Note that v k+1 may have decreased due to the removals, which causes the ratio Φ 1 to increase.
Next, we fix s 0 , . . . , s k+1 and modify r 1 , . . . , r k+1 so that eventually we have v i+1 ≤ r i (1 +σ ) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. While doing so, we will ensure (in a manner specified below) that the ratio Φ 1 does not decrease. First, if v k+1 > r k (1 +σ ), then we fix r 0 , . . . , r k and multiply r k+1 by a factor of 1 − d for sufficiently small positive d. Consequently, the bad intervals B 1 , . . . , B k remain intact and v k+1 is multiplied by a (positive) factor no greater than 1 − d (see Eq. (13)), hence the ratio Φ 1 can only increase. We choose d so that the newly obtained v k+1 coincides with r k (1 +σ ).
The following step is repeated for i = k − 1, . . . , 1. Assume by induction that v j+1 ≤ r j (1 +σ ) for every i < j ≤ k. If v i+1 > r i (1 +σ ), then we fix r 0 , . . . , r i and multiply all r j s, i < j ≤ k + 1, by a factor of 1 − d for sufficiently small positive d. Consequently, we get (i) the bad intervals B 1 , . . . , B i remain intact, (ii) the size of the bad interval B j is multiplied by a factor of 1 − d for every i < j ≤ k (see Eq. (13)), (iii) v k+1 is multiplied by a factor of 1 − d, and (iv) the assumption v j+1 ≤ r j (1 +σ ) for every i < j ≤ k is not violated. By (i) and (ii), we conclude that the numerator in the ratio Φ 1 is multiplied by a factor no smaller than 1 − d, thus, combined with (iii), the ratio Φ 1 can only increase. Once again, we choose d so that the newly obtained v i+1 coincides with r i (1 +σ ).
So, in what follows, we may assume without loss of generality that r i < v i < v i+1 ≤ r i (1 +σ ) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, which means that B i = (v i , v i+1 ) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k and it remains to bound the ratio Φ 1 = (v k+1 − v 1 )/v k+1 . Instead, we will bound the larger ratio (v k+1 − r 1 · r k+1 .
Since v k+1 ≤ r k (1 +σ ) < r k+1 (1 +σ ) < eσ r k+1 , we have r 1 > e −σ (2 log k ln(1/∆)+3)
· v k+1 . Therefore and since log k ≤ n.
A note on arbitrary technologies
We conclude the paper with a note on arbitrary technologies. The following theorem shows that every technology admits a collection of polynomial size that gives a (1 + ϵ)-approximation to the optimal contract. 
Conclusions
The hidden action problem lies at the heart of economic theory and has been recently studied from an algorithmic perspective. In this article, we continue the study initiated by Babaioff et al. [1] of the computational complexity of optimal team incentives under hidden actions. Our contribution focuses on the OR technology, whose computational complexity was raised as an open question in [1] . The importance of our results comes from the observation that OR technologies are very common in real life since agents' actions quite often serve as substitutions for each other. Indeed, the OR technology is one of the most fundamental and common interrelations between agents' tasks. We establish the NP-hardness of the problem of computing an optimal contract in an OR technology, and we also show that there exist OR technologies with exponentially large orbits (thus disproving a conjecture of [1] ). On the positive side, we devise an FPTAS for OR technologies.
In addition, we consider the more general family of series-parallel (SP) technologies, which are constructed inductively from AND and OR technologies. For SP technologies, we establish a scheme that provides a (1 + ϵ)-approximation for all but anε-fraction of the relevant instances in time polynomial in the size of the technology and in the reciprocals of ϵ and ϵ. It remains as an open problem whether there exists an approximation scheme for SP technologies. This article makes a significant step in understanding the computational complexity of the combinatorial agency model, which is an example of the important interaction between game theory, economic theory, and computer science.
